Dear Mr. President:

I transmit herewith two copies of our just completed study, "Post-Sputnik Opinion in Western Europe".

Based on interviews with cross-sections of the public in France, Great Britain, Italy and Western Germany, the survey reveals attitudes as of late November, i.e., post Sputniks I and II but prior to the failure of the U.S. Vanguard.

Findings of particular interest include:

1. In the U.K., Italy and Western Germany the Sputniks have not affected confidence in NATO effectivensess. In France, however, the attitude toward NATO is disturbingly unfavorable. Only in Italy is there predominant sentiment for devoting more money to defense or delegating more authority to NATO. (Pages 9 and 11)

2. A preponderance of respondents consider Russia is at least a little ahead of the U.S. "in scientific development at the present time," but not ahead of the Western Powers as a whole. (Page 1)

3. Despite the Sputniks, a preponderance of West Germans and Italians still believe that the U.S. is ahead of Russia in total military strength. In the U.K. and France, however, the reverse is true. Even the British and French, though, are convinced that the Western Powers as a whole are stronger militarily than the Communists. (Pages 2 and 3)
4. There has been a sharp decline in confidence that the Western Powers are superior to the Soviets in atomic weapons: from plus 26% in June 1955 to plus 9% in November 1957. (Page 3)

5. Britons, Italians, and West Germans are strongly in favor of U.S. troops remaining on their soil so long as Soviet forces are in Eastern Europe. (In France the prevailing sentiment is "Ami, go home").

However, one half or more of the public in each of the four countries favor a proposition whereby the U.S. and Britain would withdraw all their forces from the continent and give up their bases and the Soviet Union would withdraw its forces to within the borders of the USSR. (Page 9)

6. Your own popularity has remained constant in Britain, with a slight decline in the three other countries. (Page 6)

7. French opinion has shown sharp and continuing deterioration: neutralism (the proportion favoring no alliances, at all, has risen from 16% to 34%); attitude toward U.S. (down 14 points); attitude toward NATO (net confidence in NATO down from minus 5% to minus 17%). (Page 5)

8. Despite Sputnik and Little Rock, expressions of general favorable feeling toward the U.S. have remained about the same (except in France). There has been a drop however, especially in West Germany, in readiness to say that America is "doing all it should do to prevent a new world war." General feelings about the USSR, while still a net of minus 39%, have steadily been rising (from minus 68% in November 1956, and minus 53% in May 1957). (Page 6)
The Department of State does not support fully all of the detailed conclusions or interpretations in the report; due to time pressures the working out of a thorough joint analysis has not been possible.

I hope it will prove of help.

Sincerely,

G.V.A.

George V. Allen
Director